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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 In this case, we consider a challenge to a district 
court's order remanding a diversity case as improperly removed by 
a defendant who was a citizen of the forum state.  Under the 
facts of this case, our jurisdiction to consider this appeal is 
inextricably intertwined with the district court's authority to 
remand this action to state court, and thus we consider them 
together. 
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 On September 28, 1993, plaintiff Korea Exchange Bank, 
New York Branch, a citizen of New York State, filed a complaint 
against defendants Trackwise Sales Corporation, Moo Sung Ko, and 
Young S. Ko in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County, 
Law Division.  All three defendants are citizens of New Jersey. 
In the complaint, Korea Exchange sought to recover on loans it 
made to defendant Trackwise and to enforce personal guarantees 
made by the two individual defendants.  According to the 
complaint, the amount in dispute exceeds $300,000. 
 The complaint was served on Trackwise on December 28, 
1993.  On January 27, 1994, Trackwise filed a Notice of Removal 
in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey, alleging diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1332.  The other two defendants were served after the removal. 
It appears that thereafter the case lay dormant in the district 
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court for seven and one-half months, although there is a docket 
entry by a magistrate judge setting a scheduling conference for 
September 30, 1994.  On September 23, 1994, however, the district 
court sua sponte issued an order summarily remanding the case to 
state court.  In that order, the court stated that "pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. [§] 1441(b)" the case was "improperly removed because 
the defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action was 
originally brought," and "this deficiency clearly appears on the 
face of the defendant's Notice of Removal."  The court concluded 
that "pursuant to 28 U.S.C. [§] 1441(c)(4), this court should 
make an Order for Summary Remand . . . ."  Defendants filed a 
notice of appeal. 
II. 
Discussion 
 Korea Exchange contends that we lack jurisdiction over 
defendants' appeal.  It relies primarily on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), 
which provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State 
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or 
otherwise . . . ."  In adopting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), "Congress 
sought to make the judgment of a district court remanding a case 
final and conclusive in order to avoid the delay caused by 
appellate review of remand decisions."  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Ward Trucking Corp., 48 F.3d 742, 745 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 The leading case on the preclusion of review effected 
by section 1447(d) is Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 
423 U.S. 336, 346 (1976).  A district judge had remanded a 
properly removed diversity case because of an overcrowded docket, 
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rather than because the "case was removed improvidently and 
without jurisdiction," the grounds for remand set forth in 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c) at that time.  In Thermtron, the Court rejected 
a challenge to the right of an appellate court to review the 
remand order, because it construed section 1447(d) as applicable 
only to those remand orders that rely upon the grounds contained 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).  Remands issued for reasons "not 
recognized by the controlling statute," such as the reason given 
by that district judge, were not insulated from review by section 
1447(d).  Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351. 
 Section 1447(c) was amended by the Judicial 
Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 to impose a 30-day 
limit on the time the plaintiff has to file a motion "to remand 
the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure."  At 
the same time Congress deleted the "remand improvidently" 
language from section 1447(c).  Thus, the relevant portion of 
section 1447(c) now reads: 
 A motion to remand the case on the basis 
of any defect in removal procedure must be 
made within 30 days after the filing of the 
notice of removal under section 1446(a).  If 
at any time before final judgment it appears 
that the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 
 
   In Air-Shields, Inc. v. Fullam, 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 
1989), the defendant had filed an untimely removal petition and 
had failed to accompany it with the required surety bond.  More 
than 30 days after the notice of removal was filed, the district 
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court sua sponte remanded the case as having been "improvidently 
removed," language no longer in the statute.  Id. at 65.  We 
first considered whether we had jurisdiction to consider a 
petition for mandamus challenging that remand, and held that, 
under Thermtron, section 1447(d) did not preclude review under 
these circumstances.  We concluded that section 1447(d) does not 
bar review where a district court issues an untimely order of 
remand pursuant to section 1447(c) due to a "procedural defect" 
in removal, because "[b]y remanding the case for procedural 
defects after the thirty day limit imposed by the revised Section 
1447(c) had expired, the district court 'exceeded [its] 
statutorily defined power.'"  Id. at 66 (quoting Thermtron, 423 
U.S. at 351); accord Hamilton v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 5 F.3d 
642, 644 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1100 (1994); In 
re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 1049 (1992).   
 Thus, under this court's prior interpretation of 
Thermtron, we are precluded by section 1447(d) from reviewing 
remand orders based on "routine jurisdictional determinations," 
Liberty Mutual, 48 F.3d at 749; see also Carr v. American Red 
Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 682 (3d Cir. 1994), but we may review 
untimely remand orders that are based on "procedural defects." 
Air Shields, 891 F.2d at 66.  
 There is no dispute that defendants' removal of this 
case did not comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), which provides that 
actions not involving federal questions "shall be removable only 
if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as 
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defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is 
brought."  28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).  Because defendants are citizens 
of New Jersey and the case was originally filed in New Jersey 
state court, the action was not removable. 
 The question before us then is whether this was a 
"jurisdictional" defect, which would bar our jurisdiction to 
review, or whether it was a "procedural" defect, which Air-
Shields holds is reviewable.  Korea Exchange argues that because 
the district court's "jurisdiction" is based upon the removal 
statute, the court lacks "jurisdiction" over any diversity case 
that is removed by a defendant who is a citizen of the forum 
state. 
 Neither of the parties cites controlling Supreme Court 
precedent, but we are informed by a series of cases in which the 
Supreme Court consistently refused to treat the removal statute 
as imposing independent jurisdictional requirements.  For 
example, in Baggs v. Martin, 179 U.S. 206 (1900), a receiver for 
a railroad appointed by a federal court was sued in state court 
for injuries and death of a passenger.  The receiver removed the 
action, alleging a federal question because a federal court had 
appointed him.  After the receiver lost on the merits, he 
appealed, contending, inter alia, that the federal court had not 
acquired jurisdiction through the removal because his federal 
appointment did not create a federal question.  The Supreme Court 
assumed that there was no federal question supporting the 
original removal, but noted that the federal court would have had 
subject matter jurisdiction over any action brought by the 
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injured party affecting the railroad and its property in the 
hands of the receiver.  Therefore, according to the Baggs Court, 
the federal court "plainly had jurisdiction to entertain and 
determine the controversy, whether that jurisdiction was invoked 
by the parties seeking redress, or, as in this case, by the 
receiver."  Id. at 209.  The distinction between subject matter 
jurisdiction and the detail as to which party may or did bring 
the case to federal court is an important one, because it arises 
in the case before us as well. 
 A comparable issue involving a removed case was 
presented in Mackay v. Uinta Dev. Co., 229 U.S. 173 (1913).  A 
Wyoming plaintiff filed an action in state court against a 
citizen of Utah for less than the amount required for diversity 
jurisdiction in federal court, but the defendant's related 
counterclaim was for an amount that exceeded the jurisdictional 
threshold.  After the defendant removed the action to federal 
court, the case was tried without objection.  On appeal, the 
court of appeals certified to the Supreme Court the question 
whether the manner in which the jurisdiction of the federal court 
had been invoked by removal undermined its jurisdiction.   
 The Supreme Court responded that where "there was the 
requisite amount and the diversity of citizenship necessary to 
give the United States circuit court [then the trial court] 
jurisdiction of the cause . . . [t]he case . . . resolves itself 
into an inquiry as to whether, if irregularly removed, it could 
be lawfully tried and determined."  Id. at 176.  The Court 
concluded that there was no jurisdictional defect, noting that 
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"[r]emoval proceedings are in the nature of process to bring the 
parties before the United States court."  Id. (emphasis added).  
  The Mackay Court therefore recognized a clear 
distinction between the removal "process" and restrictions on the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court over the case. 
The Court analogized the issue of which party brought the case to 
federal court to the type of waivable defect such as "any 
irregularity in docketing the case or in the order of pleadings," 
and distinguished that type of defect from one affecting the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the court, which was not waivable. 
 The rule emerging from these cases was followed in 
Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699 (1972), yet 
another case in which the Supreme Court was presented with the 
effect of a removal unauthorized by the governing statute. 
General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC) sued Grubbs in a Texas 
state court.  There was both diversity and the requisite amount 
in controversy.  Grubbs filed a "cross-action" which named the 
United States as a defendant.  The United States filed a petition 
for removal, and all of the parties treated the effect of the 
removal petition as placing the entire action in the federal 
district court.  The case proceeded to trial and the district 
court ruled against GECC on its promissory note claim, awarded 
Grubbs $20,000 on one of his tort theories, and dismissed all 
claims by Grubbs against the United States.  On GECC's appeal, 
the court of appeals, on its own motion, determined that the 
United States' removal of the action had not been authorized 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1444, and it ordered that the case be remanded 
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to state court because the district court had lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case. 
 The Supreme Court reversed.  Relying upon Baggs and 
Mackay, the Court reasoned that where a case has been tried on 
the merits without objection and judgment has been entered, the 
relevant issue "is not whether the case was properly removed, but 
whether the federal district court would have had original 
jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that court." 
Grubbs, 405 U.S. at 702.  Noting that the original action 
involved a dispute between diverse parties regarding an amount 
over the jurisdictional limit, the Court concluded that the 
district court would have had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
if the action had originally been brought in federal court.  Id. 
at 704. 
 Unlike this case, all three cases considered by the 
Supreme Court had already been tried before the removal to 
federal court was questioned.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
clearly suggested, even if it did not directly hold, that it does 
not view the removal statute as imposing independent 
jurisdictional restrictions on the federal courts.  Rather, in 
considering whether jurisdictional defects existed, the relevant 
inquiry is whether the case could have been filed originally in 
federal court.  See, e.g., id. at 704.   
 A similar approach was endorsed in Thermtron, where the 
Court suggested that courts determining whether a removal defect 
is jurisdictional for purposes of precluding review under 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(d) should look to "whether the District Court would 
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have had jurisdiction of the case had it been filed initially in 
that court . . . ."  Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 344 & n.8; see also 
Allbritton Communications Co. v. N.L.R.B., 766 F.2d 812, 820 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (citing Grubbs and reiterating that in determining 
whether a defect is waivable, courts should consider whether the 
federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the case 
if it had initially been filed in federal court), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 1081 (1986). 
 We conclude therefore that an irregularity in removal 
of a case to federal court is to be considered "jurisdictional" 
only if the case could not initially have been filed in federal 
court.  In this case, there is diversity of citizenship between 
the parties and the amount in controversy is in excess of 
$50,000.  Thus, there is no dispute that this case could have 
been filed originally in federal court on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  The invocation of the 
removal machinery by a citizen of the forum state, while error, 
is not a "jurisdictional" defect under relevant Supreme Court 
precedent.  Rather, it is a "defect in removal procedure" which 
can be waived. 
 Our conclusion that section 1441(b)'s bar against 
removal by a forum-state citizen is not jurisdictional is 
consistent with the conclusions reached by almost every other 
court of appeals that has addressed the issue.  See, e.g., In re 
Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1522 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 1049 (1992); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Costa 
Lines Cargo Serv. Inc., 903 F.2d 352, 358-60 (5th Cir. 1990); 
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Farm Constr. Serv., Inc. v. Fudge, 831 F.2d 18, 21-22 (1st Cir. 
1987); Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971); Handley-Mack Co. v. 
Godchaux Sugar Co., 2 F.2d 435, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1924); see also 
Bregman v. Alderman, 955 F.2d 660, 663 (11th Cir. 1992); contra 
Hurt v. Dow Chemical Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (8th Cir. 1992). 
This same position is endorsed by several leading commentators. 
See 1A James W. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice 
¶0.157[11.-4], at 173 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that "an irregularity 
in removal is waivable" and citing as an example "where there is 
diversity but the defendant is a citizen of the state in which 
the action is brought"); William W Schwarzer, et al., Federal 
Civil Procedure Before Trial, ¶ 2:629 (1994) (noting that the 
"no-local-defendant" limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) is not 
jurisdictional and may be waived). 
 Because removal by a forum defendant in noncompliance 
with section 1441(b) does not deprive a federal court of subject 
matter jurisdiction, it is clear under section 1447(c) that this 
irregularity must be the subject of a motion to remand within 30 
days after filing the notice of removal.  See, e.g., Shell Oil, 
932 F.2d at 1522-23.  We have held that the 30-day time limit of 
section 1447(c) applies not only to motions brought by a party, 
but also to sua sponte orders of remand.  See Air-Shields, 891 
F.2d at 65.  It follows ineluctably that the district court in 
this case had no statutory authority to issue the remand order 
after the 30-day period because the defect was in the removal 
procedure rather than a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
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which could be raised at any time.  For the same reason, our 
review of the remand order is not barred by section 1447(d).  Id. 
at 66. 
 Korea Exchange emphasizes, but we find irrelevant, that 
in ordering the remand the district court erroneously cited to 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(c)(4), a non-existent subsection, in support of its 
order of remand.  It appears that the district court intended to 
rely upon 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4), which provides: 
 The United States district court in 
which such notice is filed shall examine the 
notice promptly.  If it clearly appears on 
the face of the notice and any exhibits 
annexed thereto that removal should not be 
permitted, the court shall make an order for 
summary remand. 
 
 
Korea Exchange contends that because the defect in the removal by 
the forum-state citizen defendants "clearly appeared on the face 
of the notice," section 1446(c)(4) provided authority for the 
remand.  We believe defendants are probably correct that section 
1446(c)(4) applies only to removals of criminal prosecutions, but 
even if it applies to civil cases, that section must be read in 
conjunction with the 30-day time limit imposed by section 
1447(c). 
 Thus we conclude that our review is not barred, if it 
was properly invoked.  Defendants in this case filed a notice of 
appeal.  In Thermtron, the Court suggested that where review is 
not precluded, issuance of a writ of mandamus is the "appropriate 
remedy to require the District Court to entertain the remanded 
action," because "an order remanding a removed action does not 
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represent a final judgment reviewable by appeal."1  Id. at 352-53 
(quotations omitted).  There is ample support for the proposition 
that this court may treat a notice of appeal as a mandamus 
petition.  See United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1014 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Allegheny Int'l, Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel 
Corp., 920 F.2d 1127, 1133 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Pruitt, 910 F.2d 
1160, 1167 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 Use of mandamus is appropriate "to confine an inferior 
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to 
compel it to exercise its authority when it [has the] duty to do 
so."  Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). 
Because the court improperly remanded a case over which it had 
subject matter jurisdiction, mandamus is the appropriate 
mechanism to compel the district court to exercise its 
jurisdictional authority.   
III. 
Conclusion 
 To reiterate, if the removal by a citizen of the forum 
state meant that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction, the district court would not have been subject to 
the 30-day limit on remanding the case to the state court, and 
                                                           
1
 Our decision in Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 
1207 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 (1991), where we 
reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a collateral order a district 
court order remanding that case to state court, is not to the 
contrary when examined closely.  Foster is inapplicable because 
it falls within the line of cases where, unlike here, the removal 
was alleged to be in violation of a forum selection clause of a 
contract.  Accord Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality 
Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir. 1984); Regis Assoc. 
v. Rank Hotels Mgmt. Ltd., 894 F.2d 193, 194 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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this court would have been barred from reviewing its action. 
Because the irregularity as to the party that removed the case 
that fell within the district court's diversity jurisdiction was 
a procedural defect, the district court was limited by the 
statutory 30-day time period on remand, and our review is not 
barred.     
 For the foregoing reasons, we will exercise our 
discretion to treat defendants' appeal as a petition for a writ 
of mandamus and will issue a writ requiring the district court to 
vacate its order of remand. 
 
  
